UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jerry Young ("Young") brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Michael F. Sheahan ("Sheahan") Cook County sheriff in his official capacity, Ernesto Velasco ("Velasco") director of the Cook County jail in his official capacity, and eight other deputy sheriff employees whose names are unknown. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by continuing to incarcerate him for 21 days after the judge at his preliminary hearing found "no probable cause" for his initial arrest. Defendant Sheahan moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because Plaintiff was properly detained pursuant to court order, because Plaintiff has adequate state remedy for his alleged unlawful detention, and because Plaintiff has failed to make an "official capacity" claim against the sheriff. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies Defendant Sheahan's 12(b)(6) motion.

DISCUSSION

The facts are short and straightforward. On February 3, 1998, Plaintiff Young appeared before Judge Fleming at a preliminary hearing. (Complaint ¶ 10.) Judge Fleming found that there was no probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest. (Id.) ⁽¹⁾ Notwithstanding that finding, Plaintiff was returned to jail. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff pleaded with several guards, making repeated requests and demands for release. (Id. ¶ 14-23.) He informed them that there had been a finding of no probable cause and that he was wrongfully being detained. (Id.) Plaintiff's pleas fell on deaf ears. (Id.) On February 24, 1998, Plaintiff was brought to court and again ordered released. (Id. ¶ 24.) This time, however, after only a few hours, Plaintiff was set free. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a two count complaint against Sheahan, Velasco, and eight other jail employees pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Now before the court is Defendant Sheahan's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff brings the claims against Sheahan in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cook County. A suit against a government officer in his official capacity is actually a suit against the government entity for which the officer works. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985). Therefore, Plaintiff actually brings this action against Cook County.

"A motion to dismiss should only be granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief." Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1993). As the Supreme Court has made very clear, "there is no heightened pleading requirement for civil rights actions." Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). Rather, Plaintiff needs only to abide by Rule (8)(a)(2) which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In his motion to dismiss, Defendant Sheahan argues that Plaintiff was not detained improperly because Defendants were acting pursuant to a court order which required that Plaintiff remain in custody until his release on bail or discharge by the court. (Defendant Sheahan's Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint ("Sheahan's Motion to Dismiss"), at 2-3.) In support of this contention, Defendant submits a several exhibits. (Prisoner Data Sheets, Ex. 2 to Sheahan's Motion to Dismiss.) Such documents, however, were not part of the original complaint, and thus fall outside the scope of the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Consequently, the court will not consider them in ruling on this motion to dismiss. See Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993).

Defendant maintains that Plaintiff cannot allege any constitutional deprivation of procedural due process resulting from his unlawful detention because he had adequate state law remedies at his disposal to obtain relief. (Sheahan's Motion to Dismiss, at 4.) In support of his contention, Defendant cites Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981);Pacelli v. DeVito, 972 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1992), and Toney-El v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1224 (7th. Cir. 1985). In Toney-El the court explained:

In section 1983 actions challenging the mistakes made by state employees rather that the state procedures by which those mistakes were made, Parratt requires a court 'to consider the adequacy and availability of remedies under state law before concluding that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property violates due process of law' . . .

Id. at 1227 (citing Parratt). The case at hand is distinguishable from the line of cases Defendant cites. Here, Plaintiff is not simply alleging that some one at Cook County jail made a "mistake" which caused him to be wrongly incarcerated for 21 days. Rather, Plaintiff is alleging that the wrongful detention was the result of the "policy, custom or practice of the defendants . . . not to conduct any investigation under any circumstances of claims of mistaken detention made by pretrial detainees." (Complaint ¶ 28.) Inasmuch as Plaintiff challenges the procedures by which the mistake was made, and not the mistake itself, this case does not fall within the realm of Parratt and its progeny. Consequently, Plaintiff's claim does not fail on the account of available state remedies and the court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a constitutional claim which forms the basis of his § 1983 action.

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a valid "official capacity" claim against the sheriff. Specifically, Defendant contends that the complaint's "single allegation of wrongdoing" and "boilerplate allegations" are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim. (Sheahan's Motion to Dismiss, at 7.) However, "[t]he courts in this district have read Leatherman as requiring a plaintiff to include in his complaint just a bald allegation of official custom, policy or practice." Woodget v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, 1994 WL 695453, * 3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 1994)(citations omitted). ⁽²⁾

To state a viable "official capacity" claim, Plaintiff must allege that the constitutional violation occurred as a result of the Defendant's official customs, policies, or practices. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1977); see also Holmes v. Sheahan, 930 F.2d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 960 (1991).

Case law recognizes three ways in which a municipality's policy can violate an individual's civil rights: "(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) 'a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a "custom or usage" with the force of law'; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with 'final policymaking authority.'

McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995)(quoting Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 734-35 (7th Cir. 1994)). Here, Plaintiff's complaint does sufficiently allege that he suffered injuries of a constitutional magnitude as the result of an official custom, policy or practice. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had a "policy, custom or practice . . . not to conduct any investigation under any circumstances of claims of mistaken detention by pretrial detainees." (Complaint ¶ 28.) Moreover, the complaint goes so far as to say that Defendant's "express policy is that Cook County Jail is merely a holding or detention facility and that they are under no obligation whatsoever to investigate claims of mistaken detention by pretrial detainees." (Id. ¶ 29)(emphasis added). The court finds the complaint sufficient sets forth a prima facie § 1983 claim and thus passes muster on a motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, Defendant Sheahan's motion to dismiss is denied.

ENTER:

REBECCA R. PALLMEYER
United States District Judge

Dated: November 10, 1999

ENDNOTES:

1. In paragraph 10 of the complaint, Plaintiff cites to an "Exhibit A." Nowhere in the court's copy of the complaint, nor in the official record does the court find "Exhibit A." In Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, however, Plaintiff does attach an "Exhibit A" which is a transcript of the February 3, 1998 preliminary hearing before Judge Fleming. The court will refer to this document as "Ex. A."

2. In Leatherman (discussed supra), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is not required to plead with particularity the facts on which he bases his clam of official custom, policy or practice. Leatherman, 507 U.S. 163, 165 (1993).